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1. Introduction  
The marginal tax rate (MTR) is an important input into many corporate decisions. 
For example, high marginal tax rate firms are hypothesized to use more debt, restructure 
via Chapter 11 when in distress, and participate in tax shelters. Low marginal tax rate 
firms are thought to pay employees with deferred and/or stock compensation rather than 
salary, operate as corporations rather than partnerships, and lease rather than buy assets. 
The corporate MTR also is a key input into the cost of capital and, therefore, affects 
many capital budgeting decisions.
1 Given the significance of these issues, it is important 
to measure corporate marginal income tax rates accurately and choose a rate appropriate 
to the research question. 
Ideally, to test for tax effects, researchers would construct the tax variable(s) that 
managers use in their actual decision making. In theory, such tax rates should incorporate 
the effects of net operating losses (NOLs), projections of future income, and various 
features of the tax code (for all jurisdictions), as appropriate. For economic decisions that 
are tied to an incremental dollar of income or deduction, like those mentioned above, tax 
incentives should be measured by a marginal income tax rate. 
In practice, much prior research has relied on simple static tax variables created 
from financial statement data, such as the presence of an NOL carryforward, to measure 
tax incentives. The value of a static variable is limited, however, when dynamic 
considerations are important, such as when a firm’s tax status is expected to change in the 
near future. Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a) address this concern by simulating 
                                                 
1 We measure the MTR as the present value of incremental taxes paid on an additional dollar of current-
period income, consistent with Scholes et al.’s (2005) corporate income marginal tax rate. This measure of 
the MTR on the next dollar of income differs from the concept of the marginal effective tax rate on an 
investment, which is estimated as the expected pretax return minus the expected after tax return, divided by 
the expected pretax return.  See Fullerton (1999) for a brief description.   2
marginal tax rates that capture important dynamic features of the tax code such as the 
effects of NOL carrybacks and carryforwards. While a simulated tax variable based on 
financial statement information (hereafter, the book simulated rate) is only an 
approximation of the theoretical, “true” tax variable that managers use in their actual 
decisions, it appears to be a reasonable proxy because it loads as expected in many 
economic settings (see Graham (2003) for a summary of findings). In addition, the 
simulated book MTR performs well in experiments that compare it to benchmark tax 
rates that are believed to capture important elements of the “true” tax variable. 
In one such experiment, Graham (1996b) compares financial statement tax 
variables to a benchmark marginal tax rate that models dynamic features of the tax code 
and is based on “perfect foresight” future book income. He finds that the simulated book 
MTR is most highly correlated with the perfect foresight benchmark. In a second 
experiment, Plesko (2003) tests how closely book MTRs approximate a benchmark MTR 
that is based on tax return data. Plesko examines a small sample of homogeneous, single-
entity firms, chosen to eliminate firms for which the reporting entity is likely to vary 
between financial and tax reporting. He uses 1992 data to form a static tax return tax rate 
benchmark against which to compare a collection of financial statement MTRs. Plesko 
finds that Graham’s (1996a) simulated book MTRs are the closest approximation to his 
benchmark static tax return MTR.  
While the book simulated MTR performs well in these two experiments, there are 
still unanswered questions. In particular, how closely does the book simulated rate 
approximate a tax return benchmark that incorporates dynamic features of the tax code? 
Also, do the results validating the book simulated rate hold for large, complex   3
corporations for which tax and book consolidated entities differ? The answers to these 
questions are important because they relate to issues often studied by researchers and to 
companies that are responsible for much of the world’s economic activity. 
Our paper fills this void by comparing, for a sample of large, complex firms, a 
collection of financial statement tax rates to a dynamic tax return MTR benchmark. In 
particular, we use a panel of confidential U.S. tax return data from 1992 to 2000 to 
simulate corporate income MTRs for the years 1998 to 2000. We compare these 
benchmark tax rates to a collection of financial statement MTRs to determine which is 
most highly correlated. As an alternative, we also benchmark against a simple static tax 
return MTR that is based on realized future taxable income. 
We find that, among the candidate financial statement tax variables, the book 
simulated MTR is most highly correlated with the dynamic tax return benchmark, further 
validating the book simulated MTR. The book simulated rate also performs well when 
benchmarked against the static tax return variables that are based on realized future 
taxable income. We also identify the “second best” book variables, in this case, 
categorical variables that combine information about net operating losses and the sign of 
pretax income; however, as detailed below, the amount of correlation lost by relying on 
second best, and even which variable is second best, varies by setting and benchmark.
2 
Taking all this evidence together, we conclude that researchers should use the simulated 
rate when it is available. For situations where the simulated rate is not available, we 
report algorithms that researchers can use to estimate the simulated book MTR. We also 
provide an algorithm to estimate the simulated tax return MTR for settings where tax 
                                                 
2 For example, the superiority of the simulated rate is greater when comparing MTRs based on pre-interest 
income than it is for MTRs based on post-interest income.   4
returns provide the ideal data to measure corporate tax incentives. 
Even though we use it as a benchmark, one should not assume that a tax return tax 
rate is the “true” tax variable that managers use when making all decisions. As we detail 
in Section 3, there are advantages and disadvantages to using tax return data in tax rate 
calculations. A key advantage of using tax return data is that they allow us to directly 
measure taxable income, which is difficult to estimate from financial statement data due 
to “book-tax differences.” When these differences are temporary (e.g., accelerated tax 
depreciation vs. straight line book depreciation), researchers can estimate taxable income 
by adjusting book income for deferred taxes. When the book and tax differences are not 
temporary (e.g., fines or some stock option deductions), researchers are less able to adjust 
financial statement data for book-tax differences, making tax return data appear superior. 
However, tax return based measures are not without weaknesses as proxies for the “true” 
marginal tax rate. For one thing, due to differing consolidation rules, financial statement 
and U.S. tax return data do not always represent the same entity.
3 In some situations, 
managers are likely to take actions relative to the firm’s global operations (which are 
often best represented by book data), rather than relative to domestic-only operations 
(often best reflected by U.S. tax return data). 
To put this point in perspective, and to place our paper within the literature, 
consider which tax rate variable might be preferred in different settings (as summarized 
in Figure 1).
4 The figure categorizes settings that involve worldwide vs. domestic 
                                                 
3 The U.S. tax return includes only a subset of the enterprise. While financial statements consolidate 
worldwide subsidiaries that are 50 percent or more owned, U.S. tax returns only consolidate domestic 
subsidiaries that are 80 percent or more owned. In addition, most researchers cannot access tax returns, and 
even those that do cannot access a long time series. 
4 Figure 1 should not be used as a “cook book” to determine the correct tax rate to use in a given setting. 
One should always consider the theoretical and nuanced empirical implications that apply to the particular   5
operations and those that involve long-term vs. short-term considerations. Much of our 
analysis focuses on Box 3 because we extensively study the best way to use public data to 
measure tax rates in settings where decisions are made in response to dynamic, domestic 
tax return driven incentives (e.g., situations like incremental borrowing in the U.S. or 
using transfer-pricing to place an additional dollar of income in the U.S.). In such 
settings, we conclude that researchers who only have access to public data should use a 
“predicted” simulated tax return MTR (based on coefficients that we provide in Section 
5) or a book simulated MTR (available from Graham’s website: 
http://www.duke.edu/~jgraham).  
When long-term worldwide incentives are important (Box 1), we again 
recommend that researchers use the book simulated tax rate when it is available or use a 
“predicted” simulated book MTR (based on coefficients that we also provide in Section 
5). As a case in point, in Section 7 we investigate tax incentives in corporate capital 
structure decisions, a setting where managers likely focus on the global business 
enterprise. Consistent with tax theory, we find a positive relation between simulated 
MTRs and corporate debt ratios. As expected, financial statement debt ratios are more 
highly correlated with simulated book MTRs than with tax return MTRs, most likely 
because both the debt ratio and book MTRs are based on the worldwide enterprise, while 
the tax return MTR reflects only U.S. taxable income. The capital structure evidence 
highlights that book MTRs more appropriately measure tax incentives in some settings 
than do tax return MTRs. Other settings that often affect the enterprise as a whole, and 
therefore call for the use of book tax rates, include management compensation for 
                                                                                                                                           
set of circumstances under consideration. The intent of Figure 1 is to categorize certain tax considerations 
and briefly summarize research implications to date.   6
corporate officers and trade-off settings like book-tax conformity or gain and loss 
recognition for the company as a whole (see Box 1).   
Figure 1 (Boxes 2 and 4) also categorizes tax implications occurring when short-
term considerations are important. In situations where short-term domestic considerations 
are important but tax return data are unavailable, the book simulated MTR from 
Graham’s website once again appears to be the best publicly available measure (see 
Plesko, 2003). If that variable is missing, researchers can use the coefficients estimated in 
Model C of Table 4 to create a “predicted” book simulated rate (see Box 4). Finally, we 
are not aware of research that explicitly investigates which tax variable is best when 
short-term worldwide considerations are important (see Box 2). In these situations, we 
conjecture that a static book MTR should reasonably measure tax incentives.  
To summarize, we find that simulated MTRs based on financial statement data are 
highly correlated with simulated MTRs based on tax return data, providing additional 
validity for the widespread use of simulated MTRs. We conclude that book simulated 
MTRs provide a reasonable measure of tax incentives when a researcher is attempting to 
capture long- or short-term domestic tax incentives (Boxes 3 and 4, respectively, in 
Figure 1), as well as long-term worldwide tax incentives (Box 1). 
2. Simulating dynamic marginal tax rates 
We begin by describing the procedure that we use to estimate dynamic marginal 
tax rates.
5 We define the corporate marginal income tax rate as the present value of 
current and expected future taxes paid on an additional dollar of income earned today. As 
a key part of our experiment, we operationalize this definition of the current-period MTR 
                                                 
5 Static MTRs are defined in Section 4 below (see Plesko (2003) for background and more detail).   7
by forecasting future taxable income and modeling dynamic features of the tax code. 
During our sample period, a firm that experiences a net operating loss (NOL) is allowed 
to “carry back” the loss and receive a tax refund for taxes paid in the previous two 
years. If current-year losses more than offset taxable income from the preceding two 
years, they are “carried forward” and used to offset taxable income up to 20 years in the 
future.  Additional losses are added to any unused losses from previous years and carried 
forward to shield income in future years, with the oldest losses being applied first.  
2.1 Financial statement simulated corporate marginal income tax rates 
We follow the approach developed in Shevlin (1987, 1990) and Graham (1996a, 
1996b, 1999) to simulate the dynamic features of the tax code. This process forecasts 
future taxable income by assuming that taxable income follows a random walk with drift. 
We assume that income is taxed at U.S. statutory rates.
6 
To measure taxable income, we start with consolidated book net income and add 
taxes paid. We add grossed-up minority interest and deferred tax expense from the 
statement of cash flows (or the change in deferred tax liabilities if deferred tax expense is 
missing). To gross up these amounts, we use an income-appropriate statutory tax rate (not 
always the top statutory rate). The deferred tax adjustment alters the book income number 
to account for temporary differences relative to tax return taxable income. 
To forecast future taxable income for year t+1 and beyond, we first calculate the 
                                                 
6 Using an alternative technique, Contos et al. (2006) simulate across a grid of firm characteristics and then 
map each firm’s characteristics onto the grid to assign a firm-specific MTR. Their approach may miss 
important tax status features for a given firm; however, it is computationally efficient and permits the 
number of simulations to be increased greatly. Contos et al. focus on book-tax differences and find 
moderate differences in average effective tax rates but minimal differences between book and tax MTRs. 
This latter result complements one of our general findings, though we go into greater depth by separately 
contrasting pre- and post-financing MTRs, and we identify a possible difference in the book and tax 
treatment of interest. Like us, even though they use a different simulation process and use debt from the 
tax-return as the dependent variable, Contos et al. find a positive relation between simulated tax return 
MTRs and debt usage. See also Matheson (2006).   8
mean and variance of the change in taxable income for a given firm based on its historic 
data through year t. We exclude grossed-up extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations from historical income because we assume these items are transitory. For each 
firm-year, we forecast income 22 years into the future to account for the 20-year 
carryforward period, plus an additional two years in which carrybacks can affect income 
in year t + 20. These forecasts are generated with repeated random draws from a normal 
distribution, with drift and variance equal to that gathered in the first step.
7 We simulate 
50 different forecasts of the future for each firm-year. For example, to calculate a tax rate 
for the year 2000, we forecast 50 distinct income paths for income in the years 2001 to 
2022, to account for possible carryback and carryforward effects on the year 2000 tax 
rate.   
The third step calculates the tax liability based on the statutory tax schedule along 
each of the 50 income paths generated in the second step. Net operating losses (NOLs) 
are carried back or forward to offset income along each path, with additional losses being 
added to any existing accumulated NOLs. We compute the present value of the tax 
liabilities for each path, discounting with a bond rate (Modigliani and Miller 1963).   
Because firm-specific bond yields are not readily available, we use the average Moody’s 
corporate bond yield as the economy-wide discount rate.
8 The fourth step adds $1 to 
current year income and recalculates the present value tax liability along each path. The 
incremental tax liability calculated in the fourth step, relative to that calculated in the 
                                                 
7 Graham (1996b) studies alternative forecasting approaches to the random walk with drift model. For 
example, he examines autoregressive models that account for mean-reversion in earnings. Graham 
concludes that the random walk model used herein outperforms these alternatives in the context of 
simulating corporate MTRs. In addition, he finds that the random walk forecasting model produces MTRs 
that are highly correlated with MTRs based on realized “perfect foresight” estimated taxable income. 
8  Like Shevlin (1990), we use a constant cross-sectional constant discount rate, acknowledging that this 
ignores differences in risk premia across firms.   9
third step, is the present value tax liability from earning an extra dollar today; in other 
words, the economic MTR along a given forecast path. 
The fifth step averages across the MTRs from the 50 different paths to determine 
the expected marginal tax rate for a single firm-year, which we call BookSimMTR. We 
replicate the steps for each firm for each year, to produce a panel of firm-year MTRs. The 
marginal tax rates in this panel vary across firms and can also vary through time for a 
given firm.  
We separately compute firm-year MTRs on prefinancing income. To do so, we 
add back financial statement interest expense (Compustat data item #15), plus the interest 
portion of rental payments (approximated as one-third of total rental payments #47; see 
Graham et al. (1998)), to the historical estimates of taxable income. Using these 
prefinancing data, we repeat the steps described above to simulate prefinancing corporate 
marginal income tax rates (PreIntBookSimMTR). 
2.2 Adapting the simulation procedure to use tax return data 
We also follow the steps described above to simulate tax return MTRs 
(TaxSimMTR) based on tax return data. In this case, of course, we use actual tax return 
taxable income (and we do not need to estimate taxable income like we do when we use 
financial statement data). We measure taxable income without net operating loss 
deductions as equal to Form 1120 line 28 (net income) less line 29a (the dividends 
received deduction). In the tax return simulation, we have no specific data about 
nonrecurring items, so all of the historic taxable income enters the drift and volatility 
computations. As in the book-based simulation, we build up and utilize net operating 
losses within the program based on realized losses. We carry losses back two years and   10
forward 20 years to shield actual and/or forecasted future income.  
We also separately compute tax return-based prefinancing simulated marginal tax 
rates (PreIntTaxSimMTR). We replicate the simulation after adding back interest 
deductions (Form 1120, Line 18) and one-third of rents paid (Form 1120, Line 16) to 
taxable income. 
Using the same simulation method on both datasets could induce spurious 
correlation between our book and tax simulated MTRs. For example, any systematic error 
in our estimation of the discount rate used in both simulations could induce a positive 
correlation. In addition, using the same historic period to calibrate the simulation 
procedures also has the potential to create a mechanical relation between the book and tax 
simulated MTRs. We estimate the mean and variance of income growth using only five 
or six years of historical data, which could make this potential problem more acute 
relative to a setting based on a longer historical estimation period. To partially address 
these concerns, we compare the book simulated rate to a naïve static tax return tax rate 
(FutureSimple) that is based on actual future realizations of taxable income, and therefore 
can not be mechanically related to the book simulated rate in the manner described 
above. 
3.  Using tax return data: advantages, disadvantages and measurement issues 
The primary advantage of using tax return data is the ability to measure taxable 
income accurately, although only for the tax return entities. Financial statement 
disclosures do not provide sufficient data to perfectly measure taxable income, even for 
the financial reporting entities. The primary disadvantage of using tax return data as a 
benchmark is that tax returns do not represent the same entities as do financial   11
statements. Therefore, “the firm” is not the same in the two data sources. The preferred 
definition of the firm (book or tax) depends on the research question (see Figure 1).  
3.1 Measuring taxable income – permanent differences and stock options   
When taxable income is the variable of interest but tax return data are not 
available, researchers must estimate taxable income from financial statement disclosures. 
By adding grossed-up deferred tax expense to pretax book income, we adjust book 
income for temporary differences like accelerated tax depreciation and delayed tax 
recognition of accrued losses and reserves.
9 However, deferred tax expense does not 
account for permanent differences like municipal bond interest, dividends’ received 
deductions, nondeductible penalties and entertainment expenses, and some valuation 
differences arising out of mergers and acquisitions. Though these permanent differences 
drive a wedge between taxable income from the tax return and estimates of taxable 
income from the financial statements, it is an empirical question as to how this wedge 
affects the correlation between book and tax measures of marginal tax status. 
One possible wedge is the tax deduction for employees’ exercising nonqualified 
stock options, which could reduce taxes paid far below financial statement reported 
current tax expense (Hanlon and Shevlin 2002; Graham 2003; Graham et al. 2004). 
During our sample period, corporations generally did not record stock option expense in 
their financial statements. Therefore, MTRs based on tax return income will likely be 
smaller than MTRs based on financial statement estimates of taxable income. In 
supplemental tests, we explore the degree to which stock option deductions contribute to 
                                                 
9  Our simulation program measures book-tax differences as grossed-up deferred tax expense, similar to 
Hanlon (2005). Other research (Lev and Nissim 2004, Desai and Dharmapala 2006) estimates taxable 
income as grossed-up current tax expense. Although the latter method includes permanent differences, it 
introduces additional measurement error to the extent that tax credits and other rate differences do not 
represent income differences.   12
differences between book and tax MTRs.
10 These differences should be smaller in the 
future because SFAS 123R requires companies to record book expenses for stock options 
starting in 2005.   
3.2 Entity differences  
The consolidation rules for financial statements differ from those for U.S. tax 
returns, so in some cases the enterprises are not directly comparable (Plesko 2003, Mills 
and Plesko 2003, Hanlon 2003, Mills et al. 2003). A firm typically includes all controlled 
domestic and foreign entities in its financial statements, where control generally means 
ownership greater than 50 percent. In contrast, a U.S. parent corporation can elect to file 
a consolidated tax return that includes net income or loss from all its domestic 
subsidiaries that are owned 80 percent or more (affiliated corporations) plus repatriations 
of profits from the foreign subsidiaries. These differences can lead to apples-to-oranges 
comparisons between the tax return and financial statement entities, at least in part. We 
conduct tests to explore the degree to which consolidation discrepancies explain 
differences between the financial statement and tax return simulated MTRs.  
While tax return (financial statement) data can generally be thought of as being 
ideal to represent domestic (worldwide) operations, there are exceptions. Consider a 
purely domestic company, a firm for which one might initially think that its domestic 
focus would make the tax return the ideal data source. Financial statement data include 
                                                 
10 Currently there are no machine-readable data on stock option deductions. In 2003, the IRS added a 
discrete line to Schedule M-1 to capture the book-tax difference associated with stock options. In 
supplemental tests, we use the 2003 M-1 amount of stock option difference to proxy for the use of stock 
options by a corporation during our sample period. Based on untabulated t-tests, BookSimMTR exceeds 
TaxSimMTR by 0.012 for taxpayers that claim a 2003 option deduction, but only 0.006 for taxpayers that 
do not claim the deduction. Though not quite significant (t = 1.55, p-value = 0.12), this difference suggests 
that stock option deductions reduce MTRs for some firms, consistent with estimates by Graham et al. 
(2004).   13
majority income for subsidiaries (domestic subsidiaries in this example) owned more 
than 50 percent but less than 80 percent, while these data are entirely missing from the 
tax return data. In the other direction, as might be preferred, financial statements exclude 
minority interest, which is included wholly for the 80 percent domestic subsidiaries 
consolidated in the tax return. These differences may lead to situations where financial 
statement data more closely capture domestic operations than do tax return data. 
3.3 Ease of access  
One disadvantage of using tax returns is their confidential nature. A researcher 
must work for the Treasury or have a special arrangement to access tax return data. This 
limitation highlights the importance of determining how closely book tax variables 
approximate tax return variables and also determining the accuracy of algorithms that 
approximate tax return MTRs when access to tax return data is limited.  
However, the appropriateness of the book MTR in many settings makes the 
limited availability of tax return data less disadvantageous in these settings. MTRs 
derived from financial statements are appropriate for many research questions concerning 
tax-induced decisions of the global enterprise. For example, as shown in Box 1 of Figure 
1, if the research question involves debt-related tax benefits for the enterprise as a whole 
(e.g., Graham 1996a), researchers should use a worldwide marginal tax rate (i.e., a book 
MTR). In contrast, for narrow jurisdictional questions such as the placement of debt in 
the U.S. versus a foreign subsidiary (Newberry and Dhaliwal 2001), researchers would 
want to know the marginal tax rate on income in each jurisdiction, one of which would be 
the U.S. (Box 3). It is difficult to make sweeping statements about which data source is 
better to use when constructing MTRs in any given setting. Researchers must consider   14
the particular circumstances of the experimental setting to make proper MTR and data 
choices. Guidance like that provided in Figure 1 should be used as a starting point, not as 
a definitive set of recommendations. 
 
4. Sample and univariate analysis 
We use the MatchedFile dataset constructed by the Treasury Department to merge 
financial statement data from S&P’s Compustat database with U.S. corporate tax return 
data. The Treasury samples large firms every year and only includes a random sampling 
of smaller firms. This, combined with the panel data requirements of the simulation 
method, implies that the tax return data we use over-represent large, surviving firms. 
Because of their importance to the world economy and capital markets, we argue that 
these large, complex multinationals are important to include when judging the 
reasonableness of book data. Moreover, if we find that book and tax MTRs for these 
firms closely approximate each other, even though mismatching issues due to 
consolidation and book tax differences (discussed above) are most acute for these large 
complex entities, this would suggest that book and tax MTRs are also close substitutes 
for smaller firms (where consolidation issues and book tax differences are less acute). As 
described below, this is exactly what we find when we examine a subset of (smaller) 
firms for which the book and tax entities closely match.  
MatchedFile is formed by merging records from each database by employer 
identification number (EIN) after special care is taken to align the time periods. For 
example, if a corporation has a November fiscal year-end for tax filing purposes and a 
June fiscal year-end for financial reporting purposes, MatchedFile links the November 
1998 tax return with the June 1998 financial statement, because such a match creates the   15
most overlapping months of income. MatchedFile also explicitly identifies any duplicate 
listings for the same identifier, retaining only the top-level consolidated group. For 
example, the file deletes unconsolidated filings such as large manufacturers and their 
credit corporations, retaining only the full consolidated financial statement.  
We calculate tax rates starting in 1998 because the simulation procedure uses an 
historic panel of at least five prior years of data, and the MatchedFile dataset is not 
comprehensive prior to 1992. As described above, we use historic data from 1992 
through t-1 to determine the mean and variance of taxable income to enable us to forecast 
income in t and beyond. We simulate marginal tax rates only for 1998, 1999 and 2000 for 
two reasons. First, these three years had the same net operating loss carryback (two) and 
carryforward (twenty) periods. Second, ending in 2000 permits us to calculate future 
simple static tax return MTRs from 2001 to 2004 (FutureSimple). We use these simple 
static MTRs as a secondary benchmark, as described below. We begin with 1,799 firms 
with at least five years of data between 1992 and 1997 to construct our simulations.  
Table 1 summarizes the sample composition by year and industry. Panel A shows 
1,315 companies in 1998; 1,271 in 1999; and 1,081 in 2000, for a total of 3,667 firm-year 
observations, representing 1,362 firms. All but 19 of these firms have simulated book 
MTRs on Graham’s website during our sample period. Most of our sample firms are 
manufacturers (SIC2 and SIC3). We perform some tests on a subsample that omits 61 
observations from financial service firms (SIC6).  
Table 1, Panel B describes how our sample of 1,315 observations in 1998 
compares to Compustat’s active and inactive companies’ 1998 assets (data item #6, 
dollars in millions), sales (#12), pretax income (#170), the absolute value of the   16
proportion of foreign (#272) to worldwide pretax income (#170), and the total debt 
(#9+#34) to assets (#6) ratio. To make our comparison, we compute quintiles of the 
Compustat variables, then determine the percentage of our sample that falls in those 
ranges. If our sample were perfectly representative of Compustat, one-fifth of the sample 
would appear in each Compustat quintile. As expected, for variables that indicate size 
(Assets, Sales) or profitability (Pretax Income), our sample is skewed toward the upper 
end of the Compustat population. We only compute Foreign Percent for the 466 firms 
that report nonmissing foreign income (otherwise the first four Compustat quintiles have 
zero foreign income), and our sample is relatively representative of Compustat’s 
multinational firms. More of our sample is in the middle of the Leverage distribution than 
at the tails, suggesting that large multinationals do not often operate with very small or 
extremely high leverage. 
We split the 3,667 firm-years from 1998-2000 into a test sample of 1,833 firm-
year observations and a holdout sample of 1,834 firm-year observations. We perform our 
analysis on the test sample, concluding with a regression to fit public financial statement 
data to the simulated tax return MTR. In Section 5.2, we use the estimated regression 
coefficients to predict the tax return MTRs for the holdout sample and compare those 
MTRs to the benchmark tax return MTRs.  
Table 2 presents summary information. Panel A describes various marginal tax 
rate measures. BookSimMTR  is the simulated book marginal tax rate described 
previously. The mean BookSimMTR  is 0.305. The maximum is 0.390, reflecting the 
narrow “clawback” bracket where the statutory rate is 39 percent before it falls back to 
the top-bracket statutory rate of 35 percent that applies to most large firms.    17
We also create categorical marginal tax rate variables commonly used in prior 
accounting and finance research. Following Plesko (2003), we define NOL as the 
beginning net operating loss carryfoward (prior year Compustat data item #52) and pretax 
income as data item #170. We use 35 percent as the top statutory rate to reflect current 
law. 
•  If NOL equals zero, then Binary1 equals 0.35. Otherwise, Binary1 equals 0. 
•  If NOL equals zero and pretax income is nonnegative, then Binary2 equals 0.35.  
Otherwise, Binary2 equals 0.  
•  If NOL equals zero and pretax income is nonnegative, then Trichotomous equals 
0.35. If NOL is positive and pretax income is negative, then Trichotomous equals 
zero. Otherwise, Trichotomous equals 0.17. 
•  If NOL equals zero and pretax income is nonnegative, then PseudoStatutory equals 
0.35.
11 If NOL is zero and pretax income is negative, then PseudoStatutory equals 
0.15. If NOL is positive and pretax income is positive, then PseudoStatutory equals 
0.25. Otherwise, PseudoStatutory equals zero. 
•  If NOL equals zero and pretax income is nonnegative, then Uniform equals 0.35. If 
NOL is zero and pretax income is negative, then Uniform equals 0.11667. If NOL is 
positive and pretax income is positive, then Uniform equals 0.23333. Otherwise, 
Uniform equals zero. 
As previously described, we construct prefinancing versions of the variables in 
which we first add interest expense (Compustat #15) back to pretax income prior to 
testing whether income is a profit or a loss. As expected, the prefinancing marginal tax 
rate proxies are slightly larger than each of their post-financing equivalents (e.g., mean 
Trichotomous  is 0.275, but mean Trichotomous (prefinancing) is 0.283). The higher 
mean for the prefinancing version reflects the fact that some firms have a profit before 
interest expense but a loss after interest expense.  
The tax return simulated marginal tax rate, TaxSimMTR, has a mean of 0.295 and 
                                                 
11 Plesko (2003) refers to this variable as Statutory but we re-label it PseudoStatutory.    18
a maximum of 0.390. We also use actual tax return data from 1999-2004 to construct a 
forward-looking (relative to 1998) categorical variable, FutureSimple, based on realized 
future taxable income and defined as follows: 
•  If net income (tax return Line 28) minus NOL and special deductions (Lines 29a and 
29b) is less than or equal to zero, then FutureSimple equals zero (but if the firm pays 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), FutureSimple equals 0.02). If net income minus 
NOL and special deductions is greater than zero, FutureSimple equals 0.35 (but if the 
firm pays AMT, FutureSimple equals 0.20).  
 
This definition captures two key features of the tax code: the top statutory rate and 
the AMT rate (as well as NOL deduction limits for AMT). If a firm does not have a 
taxable profit, we assign a tax rate of zero unless the firm pays AMT, in which case we 
assign a tax rate of 2 percent.
12 We generally assign the top statutory rate (35 percent) to 
profitable firms. However, if a profitable firm pays AMT, we assign the 20 percent AMT 
rate to that firm, assuming that the firm is in a range where preferences and deductions 
make 20 percent of AMT income greater than 35 percent of regular taxable income.  
We calculate FutureSimple rates for 2000 and 2003, and the average discounted 
tax rate (AvgDiscountedFutureSimple1999-2004) based on a 7.5 percent annual discount 
rate (the approximate Moody’s corporate bond rate for 1999 to 2004). FutureSimple2000 
(0.221), has a higher mean than FutureSimple2003 (0.189), consistent with 2000 being 
more economically robust.  
Table 2, Panel B presents additional summary statistics (expressed in millions of 
dollars). Our firms are large, with median book assets of $400 million and mean assets 
                                                 
12 Because we do not have all the detail from the AMT form available to us, we cannot be sure that the 
AMT paid by loss firms arises due to the NOL deduction limitation, but we believe this to be a reasonable 
assumption.   19
much larger.
13 Median pretax income per books ($27 million) exceeds taxable income 
($17 million). Consistent with off-balance-sheet financing or preferences to place 
external and/or intercompany debt in the U.S., mean tax deductions for interest ($78 
million) are higher than worldwide interest expense on the financial statement ($53 
million), although median interest amounts are no different ($9 million each for book and 
tax). These interest expense differences likely contribute to book income exceeding 
taxable income.  
About one-fifth of our sample has losses, as captured by the following dummy 
variables: worldwide pretax loss (BookLossDummy) 18.2 percent, U.S. pretax loss 
(USBooklossDummy) 20.1 percent, and taxable loss (Taxloss) 22 percent. Although one-
fourth of the sample discloses a net operating loss carryforward on its financial 
statements, only 7.6 percent has both a current year book loss and an NOL carryforward.  
A much higher proportion of the tax returns have available NOLs on the tax return (45 
percent). Because NOLs acquired from target subsidiaries are difficult to use (due to 
Internal Revenue Code section 381 and 382 limitations), NOLs that are immaterial for 
financial statement disclosure can persist on the tax return for many years. 
The sample firms have significant multinational activity: 35.3 percent have 
foreign pretax book income greater than five percent of worldwide pretax book income in 
absolute value, and 38.5 percent claim a foreign tax credit on the U.S. tax return. Sample 
firms generally report a current effective tax rate on U.S. income (USETR) below the 
statutory rate. Mean USETR is only 22.1 percent, and 22.4 percent of our sample firms 
have an USETR below 10 percent.  
                                                 
13 Book assets from the tax return are larger than consolidated financial statement assets because some 
firms do not post elimination entries when preparing the Schedule L balance sheet (Boynton et al. 2004).   20
4.1 Correlation between financial statement and tax return marginal tax rates 
Table 3 quantifies the relation between financial statement and tax return MTRs. 
The first column presents the correlations of TaxSimMTR with BookSimMTR and the 
other financial statement tax variables. In Panel A (Panel B), all variables are defined on 
a post-financing (prefinancing) basis. The correlation between TaxSimMTR and 
BookSimMTR is 67.1 percent in our test sample (Panel A). This correlation is relatively 
high considering likely consolidation differences and other issues described in Section 3.  
Figure 2 displays the relation between TaxSimMTR  and  BookSimMTR. Most 
observations cluster near zero percent and the top statutory rates, reflecting the high 
correlation between the two tax rates; however, there are only a few clustered 
observations along the interior diagonal. The main disconnect between BookSimMTR and 
TaxSimMTR occurs along the back row of Figure 2, where book MTRs are high but tax 
MTRs vary across the board for these same observations. This reflects that worldwide 
imputed taxable income based on financial statement data often exceeds taxable income 
from the U.S. tax return (consistent with the means presented in Table 2, Panel B). We 
conjecture that another contributing factor is that we exclude discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items from income in the book simulations but cannot do the same for the 
tax simulations. Including such items increases the volatility of income (Lipe 1986) and 
decreases the level of income (Collins et al. 1997), leading to TaxSimMTR having more 
variation and lower values relative to BookSimMTR. 
If we limit the sample to the 45 observations for which the financial statement 
enterprise likely equals the tax enterprise (per Plesko’s 2003 screens) the correlation   21
between  TaxSimMTR and BookSimMTR increases to 97 percent (untabulated).
14 This 
high correlation arises because Plesko’s screens result in a sample of homogenous firms.  
Other common financial statement proxies are not as highly correlated with 
TaxSimMTR. The worst proxy for our sample is one of the most commonly used in 
academic research: the net operating loss dummy variable (Binary1,  ρ = 0.223).   
TaxSimMTR is more highly correlated with the financial proxies that assign a top 
marginal tax rate only if a corporation has neither a current year loss nor an NOL. For 
example,  Binary2 is more highly correlated with TaxSimMTR ( ρ = 0.483). However, 
Binary2 performs worse than the remaining variables, presumably because Binary2 
equals zero whenever a firm has an NOL, a loss, or both. Thus, Binary2 can be zero for 
firms that have a profit, just like Binary1. Trichotomous, PseudoStatutory and Uniform 
all assign the maximum statutory rate when the corporation has positive income with no 
NOL, and assign a zero marginal rate when the corporation has both an NOL and a loss. 
Although they differ slightly in the presence of either an NOL or a loss, but not both, the 
correlations all improve over Binary1 and Binary2. The correlations of TaxSimMTR with 
Trichotomous, PseudoStatutory, and Uniform are 0.556, 0.632 and 0.633, respectively.  
In the second, third and fourth columns of Table 3, Panel A, we compare 1998 
values for various tax variables to FutureSimple tax rates that are based on actual future 
taxable income in 1999 to 2004. TaxSimMTR is highly correlated with all the 
FutureSimple rates (ρ = 0.564, 0.384, and 0.600), which indicates that ignoring AMT in 
                                                 
14  We replicate the screens imposed by Plesko (2003) in turn. In all cases BookSimMTR is more correlated 
with TaxSimMTR than are the other financial statement proxies. First, ρ = 78 percent for the 459 
observations that have financial statement assets within 0.5 percent of their book assets reported on the tax 
return, Form 1120, Schedule L. Results are unchanged when we drop one observation that is a domestic 
subsidiary of another taxpayer and 63 observations for taxpayers that are owned 50 percent or more by 
another corporation. After we drop another 138 observations for firms that have controlled foreign 
corporations, ρ = 76 percent for the remaining 257 observations.    22
the simulation is not a major deficiency. BookSimMTR is also highly correlated with 
FutureSimple, attenuating concerns that the strong relations between tax return MTRs 
and the book simulated MTR might be driven by mechanical artifacts (such as using a 
common discount rate or common historical period to simulate both book and tax MTRs). 
Of the other variables based on financial statements, Uniform  is the most highly 
correlated with the FutureSimple measures.  
Table 3, Panel B repeats the exercise for all the correlations based on prefinancing 
income.  PreIntBookSimMTR  is highly correlated (ρ=0.760) with prefinancing 
TaxSimMTR,  more so than correlations for  the other prefinancing MTR proxies. 
BookSimMTR and TaxSimMTR are more highly correlated on a prefinancing basis (in 
Panel B) than on a post-financing basis (in Panel A), suggesting that book-tax differences 
in interest expense make it difficult to estimate U.S. taxable income from financial 
statements (as previously documented in Mills and Newberry 2005). Analogous to the 
post-financing results, the book net operating loss (Binary1) is the worst proxy for the 
prefinancing TaxSimMTR (ρ = 0.177).  
To construct prefinancing FutureSimple, we add interest deductions (Line 15) to 
income prior to evaluating loss or profit for the zero and 35 percent rates. 
PreIntBookSimMTR is highly correlated with each of the prefinancing versions of 
FutureSimple 2000, FutureSimple 2003 and AvgDiscountedFutureSimple1999-2004 (ρ = 
0.428, 0.335 and 0.520, respectively). All the prefinancing FutureSimple variables are 
more correlated with the PreIntBookSimMTR than with the static prefinancing financial 
statement proxies (Binary1, Binary2, Trichotomous, PseudoStatutory and Uniform).   
To sum up, Table 3 provides consistent evidence that the Shevlin/Graham   23
simulated book marginal tax rates are reasonable proxies of a firm’s tax return dynamic 
tax status (Box 3 of Figure 1) because BookSimMTR is more highly correlated with the 
tax return marginal tax rates than are the other book tax variables. 
5. Regressions to explain simulated marginal tax rates 
Because a simulated marginal tax rate for the U.S. portion of the enterprise is 
appropriate for some research questions, we develop algorithms that use publicly 
available data to “predict” TaxSimMTR.  We also develop an algorithm to predict 
BookSimMTR for situations when it is not available.
15 The algorithms include five 
explanatory variables that address consolidation differences: 
TaxSimMTRit  = α0 + α1BookSimMTRit+ α2 USBookLossDummyit + α3 
LowUSETRDummyit  + α4 NOLDummyit + α5 BookLossDummyit + α6 
ForeignActivityDummyit + εit, 
or 
BookSimMTRi = α0 + α1 LowUSETRDummyit  + α2 NOLDummyit  
+ α3 BookLossDummyit + α4 ForeignActivityDummyit + εit,  
where 
TaxSimMTR and BookSimMTR are the tax and book simulated tax rates.  
USBookLossDummy  =1 if Compustat #272 (or, #170 if #272 missing) < 0, zero 
otherwise. 
LowUSETRDummy = 1 if #63/#272 (or, #16/#170 if missing) < 10 percent, zero 
otherwise. 
NOLDummy =1 if #52 > 0, zero otherwise. 
BookLossDummy = 1 if nonmissing #170 < 0, zero otherwise. 
                                                 
15 In 2005, there are 6,937 firms on Compusat with nonmissing assets and nonmissing firm identifiers. 
Graham’s website provides simulated book MTRs for 4,518 of these firms (based on GVKEY matching).  
That is, there are 2,523 Compustat firms that do not have a 2005 Graham simulated MTR match. These 
observations are missing either because the firm is new to Compustat and therefore has insufficient 
historical data to run the simulation (1,408 firms) or otherwise has missing data for one or more of the key 
input variables in the simulation procedure.   24
ForeignActivityDummy = 1 if |#273/#170| > 5 percent, zero otherwise. 
Two of these variables are specifically related to the U.S. entities. We include 
U.S. book losses and low U.S. current effective tax rates because our univariate analysis 
revealed mismatches with high BookSimMTR but near-zero TaxSimMTR (see Figure 2). 
In the TaxSimMTR specification, we include USBookLossDummy, which indicates a U.S. 
pretax loss, because the corporation could lose money in its U.S. jurisdiction even if it 
had worldwide profits. In all the models, we include LowUSETRDummy, an indicator for 
an average U.S. current effective tax rate below 10 percent. With this variable, we 
capture the presence of U.S. permanent differences that the simulation ignores and any 
U.S. temporary differences that vary substantially from the worldwide temporary 
differences that the simulation already incorporates. To the extent that such U.S.-specific 
differences decrease U.S. taxable income, TaxSimMTR will be lower than BookSimMTR, 
leading to negative coefficients on USLossDummy and LowUSETRDummy. 
We include ForeignActivityDummy to capture the presence of substantial foreign 
income, although we make no prediction about its sign. TaxSimMTR could exceed 
BookSimMTR  if foreign losses or intercompany payments make U.S. taxable income 
higher than worldwide financial statement income or if multinational firms have high 
TaxSimMTR because of their size. Alternatively, if intercompany payments out of the 
U.S. exceed payments into the U.S., TaxSimMTR could be lower. 
Because we also estimate regressions of TaxSimMTR without BookSimMTR as an 
explanatory variable, and we estimate BookSimMTR separately, we include NOLDummy 
and BookLossDummy. We expect the coefficients on these variables to be negative when 
we estimate TaxSimMTR without BookSimMTR, as well as when we model BookSimMTR   25
as a dependent variable. We are unsure whether these variables will improve the fit of 
TaxSimMTR in the specification that includes BookSimMTR.  
5.1 Regression results 
Table 4 presents regression estimates. Panel A uses post-financing marginal tax 
rates, and Panel B uses prefinancing rates. In Model A, we regress TaxSimMTR on 
BookSimMTR and additional publicly-available variables. The intercept is 0.21, and the 
slope coefficient on BookSimMTR  is 0.379. By comparison, untabulated univariate 
regressions of TaxSimMTR on BookSimMTR alone generate an intercept of 0.079 and a 
slope coefficient of 0.709.
 The adjusted R
2 increases from 45 percent in the untabulated 
univariate regression to 58 percent in the multivariate regression shown in Panel A. 
Model A indicates that negative U.S. pretax income (USBookLossDummy)  is 
significantly associated with a lower TaxSimMTR (coefficient = -0.042, t = -3.63). The 
negative relation is consistent with U.S. taxable income being negative if U.S. pretax 
income is negative, even in those cases where a multinational is profitable on a 
worldwide basis. LowUSETRDummy is strongly negatively associated with TaxSimMTR 
(coefficient= -0.053, t-statistic = -10.47). We infer that the average current effective tax 
rate helps to incorporate permanent differences that the simulation cannot easily 
estimate.
16  NOLDummy  and  BookLossDummy  are both negatively related to the 
dependent variable even though BookSimMTR is already in the regression. TaxSimMTR 
could be lower for firms that have prior or current book losses because our tax return 
                                                 
16 In untabulated tests, we also include a proxy for corporate tax deductions for exercises of nonqualified 
stock options, which would decrease taxable income relative to book income. The tax return only requires 
stock option information starting in 2003. We use the 2003 tax return Schedule M-1 book-tax difference 
scaled by assets as a proxy for substantial option deductions. This proxy is negatively associated with 
TaxSimMTR with a t-statistic of -3.00. The backward-looking proxy is undoubtedly extremely noisy, but 
suggests that better stock option data could improve marginal tax rate simulations.    26
taxable income includes all sources of loss, including any extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations that the book forecast of taxable income excludes. Finally, 
TaxSimMTR is higher in the presence of substantial foreign pretax income. We conjecture 
that foreign income could proxy for size or repatriations, making U.S. taxable income 
higher or more consistently profitable than worldwide net income.  
In untabulated tests, we find that a wide-scale data-fitting exercise that includes 
additional Compustat variables does not improve the fit in a stable, informative manner.
17 
We conclude that the coefficient estimates in the parsimonious Model A of Table 4 can 
be used to create a reasonable approximation of the simulated tax return MTR for 
researchers without access to Treasury data.  
 We  also  estimate  TaxSimMTR  without  BookSimMTR  for cases where 
BookSimMTR is missing. Model B in Table 4, Panel A shows that the R
2 falls to 51 
percent, but the overall fit remains strong and the coefficients are similar in magnitude 
and significance.  
Model C shows that the categorical variables are also useful in estimating the 
BookSimMTR. Researchers who would like to use a simulated book MTR but find it 
unavailable for certain firms or in certain years can use the coefficients in Model C to 
estimate the MTR. 
Our results (untabulated) are unchanged if we include industry (1-digit SIC) and 
year controls, and the coefficients on the industry and year dummies are insignificant. 
                                                 
17 We consider 58 additional candidate explanatory variables from the income statement, balance sheet, and 
statement of cash flow (list of variables is available on request). Using ordinary least squares forward 
selection, we evaluate each of these variables. Only about ten variables meet the 0.01 significance level. As 
in the main specification, BookSimMTR and the dummy variables for having negative U.S. pretax book 
income (book net operating loss carryforward and negative pretax book income) are among these top ten 
variables; however, the new significant variables are sensitive to the sample (test versus holdout), so we do 
not pursue this analysis any further.   27
This suggests that our explanatory variables work reasonably well across industries and 
our three-year time period. We also estimate our main regression (Table 4, Panel A, 
Model A) by industry (1-digit SIC) and by year. Only for SIC1 = 6, financial services, is 
the regression fit substantially different, with the R
2 decreasing to 25 percent. Our main 
results are robust to omitting the 61 firm-year financial services observations.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results for an analogous set of regressions to 
estimate prefinancing MTRs. Results are qualitatively the same as in Panel A. Consistent 
with univariate results from Table 3, TaxSimMTR is more closely associated with 
BookSimMTR on a prefinancing basis than on a post-financing basis, as indicated by the 
larger t-statistic in Panel B. As before, researchers who would like to use a simulated 
prefinancing book MTR but find it unavailable could use the coefficients in Model C to 
estimate BookSimMTR. 
5.2 Analysis using the holdout sample 
In Table 5, we report holdout sample correlations between the various tax 
variables and TaxSimMTR. Because Table 4 presents only the significant variables from 
among several candidate regression specifications, it is important to determine whether 
the implications are consistent in the holdout sample.  
We compute EST_TaxSimMTR by interacting the regression coefficients 
estimated in Model A of Table 4 with the applicable variable values for the holdout 
observations. EST_TaxSimMTR is highly correlated (75.1 percent) with TaxSimMTR in 
the holdout sample. The 75 percent correlation is equivalent to a univariate regression R
2 
of 56.25 percent, and recall that the R
2 of the predictive regression in Table 3 was 58 
percent. Thus, most of the model’s predictive ability carries over to the holdout sample,   28
indicating that our findings are not driven by data snooping.  
The holdout results also shed further light on the univariate relations between the 
various variables. As in Table 3, BookSimMTR is more highly correlated (65.3 percent) 
with  TaxSimMTR than are the other financial statement proxies (highest correlation 
equals 63.7 percent).  
We replicate these tests on a prefinancing basis in the second column of Table 5. 
The results are remarkably similar. The prefinancing EST_TaxSimMTR  is strongly 
correlated (ρ  = 0.723) with the prefinancing TaxSimMTR in the holdout sample. Like in 
the test sample, BookSimMTR is more highly correlated on a prefinancing basis with 
TaxSimMTR than on a post-financing basis. Similarly, the prefinancing BookSimMTR is 
more highly correlated with prefinancing TaxSimMTR than are the other prefinancing 
financial statement tax variables. 
6. Tax credits and the alternative minimum tax 
Our simulation model is based on regular taxable income. Although we simulate 
income paths and permit loss carrybacks and carryforwards, we ignore tax credits and the 
alternative minimum tax. In this section, we explain why we believe our simulated rates 
are reasonable without considering credits and AMT. 
Few firms have tax credits that shield a substantial proportion of tax.
18 In 
untabulated tests, 30 percent of the firms in our sample have no tax credits on their tax 
returns. Further, the firms with the largest proportional credits also have the highest 
taxable income and the highest foreign tax credits. On average, for firms in the top one-
fifth of pretax income, total credits shield 34 percent of tax, and foreign tax credits alone 
                                                 
18 Of the 1,409 observations that report credits, the 95
th percentile of credits to total tax is 82 percent and 
the 99
th percentile is 94 percent.   29
shield 31 percent of tax. Thus, most of the credits for large firms are foreign tax credits, 
which should not generally reduce the marginal income tax rate on a dollar of U.S. source 
income.
19  The evidence implies that the tax rates that we simulate are likely similar to 
the marginal tax rates one would obtain if one were to simulate tax rates including the 
effects of tax credits.  
Our simulations also ignore the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).
20  Untabulated 
tests using tax return data indicate that firms that pay AMT often claim a NOL deduction 
(ρ = 0.35). Because our simulation likely assigns a low MTR to firms whose regular 
income is sheltered by carryforward losses, we have not misstated the MTR materially by 
ignoring AMT. If a firm pays AMT because of the NOL limitation, the tax rate is 
effectively two percent. Thus, we do not introduce much error by assigning a zero percent 
MTR rather than the present value of a two percent temporary AMT rate.
21 Recall also 
that in Table 3, TaxSimMTR (which ignores AMT) is highly correlated with the 
FutureSimple tax rates that incorporate AMT, again indicating that ignoring AMT in the 
simulations does not appear to cause significant problems.   
7.  Which marginal tax rate best captures capital structure tax incentives? 
In this section, we test the relative power of prefinancing BookSimMTR  and 
TaxSimMTR to explain capital structure. As in most extant research, we measure capital 
                                                 
19 We acknowledge that foreign tax credits can affect the marginal benefit of an additional dollar of interest 
deduction (Newberry 1998 and Graham 2003). 
20 Graham (1996a) developed his simulated rates shortly after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 created a new 
AMT adjustment for half of any positive difference between book and taxable income, which was easy to 
model in the simulation program. This adjustment expired in 1990 and was replaced by an adjustment that 
is 75 percent of the gap between taxable income and adjusted current earnings (ACE). Because ACE is 
closer to taxable income and the adjustment can be positive or negative, we do not explicitly account for 
AMT in our simulations. 
21 Also, the AMT is a temporary tax that reverses through a credit when the taxpayer pays regular tax. Both 
BookSimMTR and TaxSimMTR are significantly, negatively correlated (-44 percent and -45 percent) with 
the ratio of AMT to tax before credits in untabulated tests. Thus, the simulated MTRs are already low for 
firms subject to AMT, further confirming the reasonableness of a simulation that ignores AMT.    30
structure with financial statement debt ratios. The trade-off theory of capital structure 
predicts that firms with high marginal tax rates should use more debt than firms with low 
tax rates because the benefit of interest deductions is greater for high tax rate firms.  
Despite this straightforward prediction, empirically testing for tax effects is 
difficult because a spurious relation can exist between the financing decision and many 
tax variables. Specifically, interest expense is tax deductible, so a firm that finances its 
operations with debt reduces its taxable income, potentially reducing its expected 
marginal tax rate. If not properly addressed, this endogeneity of the tax rate can bias an 
experiment against finding a positive relation between debt ratios and taxes. To avoid this 
difficulty, we follow Graham et al.  (1998) and use a prefinancing measure of the 
corporate MTR (that is based on taxable income before interest deductions) because it is 
not endogenously affected by financing decisions. This allows us to regress debt ratios on 
tax rates without concern of the possibility of a spurious negative relation. 
We model leverage (debt to book value of assets in one specification and debt to 
market value of assets in another) as a function of the prefinancing MTR and control 
variables: 
Leverageit = b0 + b1 PrefinancingMTRit + b2 LagSalesit + b3 LagMarketToBookit 
+b4 LagDividendit + b5 LagROAit + b6 LagCollateralit + eit ,  
 where 
Leverage = total debt (Compustat item #9 + #34), scaled by total assets (#6) in one 
specification, or by market value of assets (total assets minus book equity plus 
market equity (#6 - #60 + #199*#25)) in a second specification.
22 
PrefinancingMTR = PreIntBookSimMTR or PreIntTaxSimMTR.  
                                                 
22 Like Mills and Newberry (2005), we do not use leverage ratios from the tax return Schedule L balance 
sheet because Schedule L is supposed to be a book balance sheet. Further, the assets and liabilities often 
exceed the worldwide consolidated book amounts, a surprising result that arises from some firms not 
posting consolidation elimination entries (Boynton et al. 2004).   31
LagSales = one-year lag of book sales (#12) 
LagMarketToBook = the lagged ratio of market value of equity (#199*#25) to book value 
of equity (#60). 
LagDividend = 1 if the lagged dividend yield (#26*100/#199) is positive, zero otherwise. 
LagROA = lagged return on assets (#18/#6). 
LagCollateral = the lagged ratio of receivables and property (#3+#8) to assets (#6).  
 
To aid comparison across specifications, we limit the sample to the 1,771 
observations that have nonmissing data in all specifications. We expect the simulated 
book MTR to be better than the simulated U.S. tax return MTR at explaining leverage 
because, like all Compustat-based research, we define leverage with financial statement 
data. As discussed above, TaxSimMTR is based on U.S. taxable income, where only 
domestic corporations owned 80 percent or more are included as affiliates of the U.S. 
parent, and therefore is defined on a different basis than the dependent variable.  
Table 6 shows that PreIntBookSimMTR is strongly positively related to the debt to 
assets ratio (coeff = 0.294, t = 4.50). The 0.294 coefficient on PreIntBookSimMTR in the 
debt/assets specification indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the tax 
variable leads to a debt ratio that is two percentage points higher. For example, if a firm 
with the sample mean tax rate (0.305) has the sample mean debt ratio (0.26), then if its 
MTR were one standard deviation (0.102) higher, its debt ratio would change to 0.29 
(=0.26+0.294*0.102). We also find that PreIntTaxSimMTR is positively related to the 
debt to assets ratio (coeff = 0.138, t = 2.02). The explanatory power of the book MTR 
regression (R
2 = 7.3%) exceeds the explanatory power of the tax MTR regression (R
2 = 
6.4%) based on a Vuong (1989) test (p-value = 0.0496).
23     
PreIntBookSimMTR is strongly, positively related to the debt to market value ratio 
(coeff = 0.433, t = 7.73). Likewise, PreIntTaxSimMTR is positively related to the debt to 
                                                 
23 See Dechow (1994) and Hanlon et al. (2005) for implementation of this test.   32
market value ratio (coeff = 0.271, t = 4.59).  As above, the R
2 (11.4%) of the book MTR 
regression exceeds the R
2 (9.5%) of the tax MTR regression based on a Vuong (1989) 
test (p-value = 0.0048). The bottom line is that the book simulated MTR appears to best 
measure worldwide capital structure tax incentives in our sample, leading us to conclude 
that researchers can continue to use book simulated rates in most capital structure 
settings.
24 This result highlights that tax return data are not the “holy grail” in all 
experiments, and in fact measuring tax incentives with book data is preferred in some 
settings (as summarized in Figure 1). 
8. Conclusion 
  Companies likely consider their tax return MTRs when making many decisions 
but tax returns are not publicly available to researchers investigating those decisions. 
Therefore, most researchers measure corporate tax incentives using financial statement 
data. In this paper we access corporate tax return data to simulate a MTR that captures 
dynamic tax return effects. We compare financial statement tax variables to this (usually 
unavailable) dynamic tax return MTR to determine which, if any, book MTRs can be 
used to reliably proxy for the tax return variable when it is unavailable.  
We find the simulated financial statement MTR (of Shevlin (1990) and Graham 
(1996a)) is the best financial statement-based tax rate in terms of most closely 
approximating the simulated tax return MTR. Thus, our recommendation is that 
                                                 
24  In untabulated tests, we consider two other tax rate variables: 1) The presence of a net operating loss, 
disclosed either in the financial statements (Compustat #52) or on the tax return (Schedule K); 2) the 
average tax rate, either worldwide current tax expense divided by pretax income (Compustat #16/#170), or 
tax after credits divided by net income (line 28 on the tax return), computed for observations with positive 
numerators and denominators. The alternative tax variables do not perform well. Firms with NOLs have 
higher leverage, opposite the predicted relation. The current worldwide book effective tax rate is positively 
related to leverage, as predicted, but the tax return average effective tax rate is negatively related. We 
conclude that both of these tax variables are poor measures of debt tax incentives. Further details are 
available on request.   33
researchers use the simulated book MTR when it is available, assuming that dynamic tax 
rates are appropriate for a given research setting (see Figure 1). Because the simulated 
MTR is not always available, we provide coefficients that can be used to create a 
“predicted” book simulated MTR when it is missing.  
We also discuss how different tax rates (book versus tax; dynamic versus static) 
might be preferred in different experimental settings. For example, we find that financial 
statement debt ratios, which arguably are the variable under consideration in many capital 
structure decisions, are highly correlated with the book simulated MTR, consistent with 
the appropriateness of this tax variable in this setting. In contrast, in other settings, such 
as transfer-pricing or the issuance of U.S. debt, dynamic tax return MTRs best capture 
corporate tax incentives, and therefore a simulated tax return MTR would be most 
appropriate. Because tax return data are often not publicly available, we provide 
coefficients that can be used to create a “predicted” dynamic tax return MTR. 
Finally, as summarized in Figure 1, we also discuss which tax rates might affect 
decisions in short-term or myopic research settings, such as decisions by retiring 
executives. Future research is needed to more thoroughly investigate the appropriate tax 
variable that is or should be used in these short-term settings. 
   34
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Figure 1 – Marginal corporate income tax rate to use in different empirical settings.  This chart summarizes various corporate income
tax rate variables and the setting in which each is appropriate. This chart is not intended to be used as a cookbook. The specific theoretical
and empirical circumstances must be considered to determine the best MTR variable in any particular setting. The figure dichotomizes on 
worldwide vs. domestic because due to consolidation rules, financial statement (“book”) data generally represent the worldwide operations
of a firm, while tax return data generally represent domestic income only.The short-term considerations depicted in the figure represent 
situations where a company responds to short-term tax incentives, sometimes optimally and sometimes because the decision-makers
are overly focused on the short-run. In either case, short-term tax variables could be empirically correlated with the company’s decisions.      36
Long-term
considerations
Pre-financing vs. Post-financing: Pre-financing MTRs remove the effect of past financing decisions (that are still part of existing capital structure) and are 
appropriate to use when the dependent variable is a stock measure of capital structure (like a debt ratio). Post-financing tax rates are based income after interest
deductions and are the appropriate MTRs in most other settings, including those in which the dependent variable measures future incremental financing choices.
Effective Tax Rates: Accounting-based effective tax rates measure the average tax burden and are typically measured as tax divided by income. See Plesko 
2003 for discussions of various numerators (current vs. total tax, U.S. versus worldwide) and denominators (U.S. versus worldwide, with or without adjustments).
Related issues
Example settings: long-term financing,
managerial compensation, book-tax
conformity, corporate hedging, after-tax
cost of debt, R&D limited partnerships, 
organizational form, corporate pension
funding, M&A, etc.
Preferred tax rate: 
a) simulated book MTR
b) “predicted” simulated book MTR 
(using coeffs from Model C in Table 4
of this paper)




Example settings: short-term focus like 
book-based bonuses to retiring CEOs,  
EPS myopia, or company about to cease 
operations as an independent unit.
Preferred tax rate: 
We are not aware of rigorous research
into this issue. We conjecture that a 
static book MTR would reasonably 
measure myopic short-term incentives. 
Long-term
considerations
Example settings: Long-term decisions
where income ends up in U.S., such as 
transfer-pricing or borrowing in U.S. 
versus another country or jurisdiction.
Preferred tax rate: 
a) dynamic tax return MTR if available
b)“predicted” simulated tax return MTR
(using coefficients estimated in Model 
A or B in Table 4 of this paper)




Example settings: short-term focus like
bonuses to retiring domestic
divisional managers.
Preferred tax rate: 
a) static tax return MTR if available
b) simulated or “predicted” book MTR,
or static MTR (Plesko 2003)
1. 2. 3. 4.  37



































Relative Frequency of Sample Firms in Each Tax Rate Bin
 
 
TaxSimMTR and BookSimMTR represent simulated marginal tax rates using tax return data or Compustat 
financial statement data, respectively. The simulation follows and adapts Graham’s (1996a) method. The 
tax rates are simulated to account for the effect of tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards on the present 
value tax liability of adding an extra dollar of current period taxable income.   38
Table 1 – Sample Composition Summarized by Year and Industry 
 
This table identifies the year and industry for the observations in our full sample. The sample of 3,667 firm-year observations is 
derived from the U.S. Department of Treasury’s matched file of Compustat and tax return data for which a panel of firms from 1992-
2000 is available. We limit our tests to 1998-2000 to consider years when the net operating loss rules consistently carryback two years 
and carryforward 20 years.  
 
Panel A, Frequency by year and industry         
Year    Frequency  Percent of panel 
1998   1,315  35.86% 
1999   1,271  34.66% 
2000   1,081 29.48% 
   3,667  100.00% 
      
      
1-digit SIC  Industry Type  Frequency  Percent of panel 
0 Agriculture,  Forestry,  Fishing  14  0.38% 
1 Mining,  Building  212  5.78% 
2 Manufacturing  766  20.89% 
3 Manufacturing  1,237  33.73% 
4 Transportation,  Communication, Electric, Gas  317  8.64% 
5 Wholesale,  Retail  535  14.59% 
6 Financial  Services  148  4.04% 
7 Hotels,  Services  317  8.64% 
8 Services  107  2.92% 
9 International,  Non-Operating  14 0.38% 
   3,667  100.00% 
   39
 
Panel B, Percentage of 1998 sample observations distributed in each quintile of Compustat active and inactive companies, using 1998 
Assets (Compustat data item #6), Sales (#12), Pretax Income (#170), ForeignPercent, the absolute value of the proportion of 
nonmissing foreign pretax income (#272) to Pretax Income, and Leverage, the ratio of total debt (#9+#34) to Assets. The lower panel 
shows the quintile breakpoints for each variable in millions of dollars. 
 
 















Assets  % of sample  3% 14% 26%  30% 27%
Sales  % of sample  3% 9% 18%  33% 37%
Pretax Income  % of sample  15% 8% 15%  27% 35%
Foreign Percent  % of sample  17% 22% 23%  20% 18%
Leverage  % of sample  13% 19% 27%  38% 14%



















Assets    13.331 63.732 248.732 1095.46  
Sales    8.798 40.003 150.922 684.485  
Pretax Income    -6.000 -0.012 7.144 48.084  
Foreign Percent    0.046 0.148 0.33 0.673  
Leverage    0.015 0.134 0.288 0.471  
   40
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for the matched Compustat and tax return test sample of 1,833 firm-year observations in 1998, 1999 
and 2000. Panel A describes the key tax variables. BookSimMTR is the simulated marginal tax rate using Compustat data, following 
and adapting Graham (1996a). The simulated marginal tax rates are simulated to account for the effect of tax-loss carrybacks and 
carryforwards on the present value tax liability of adding an extra dollar of current period taxable income. If beginning net operating 
loss carryforward (prior year Compustat data item #52) equals zero, then Binary1 equals 0.35. Otherwise, Binary1 equals 0. For the 
other categorical variables, pretax income is generally Compustat data item #170, but for the prefinancing variables pretax income is 
before interest, #170 + #15. If beginning net operating loss carryforward equals zero and pretax income is nonnegative, then Binary2 
equals 0.35.  Otherwise, Binary2 equals 0. If beginning net operating loss carryforward equals zero and pretax income is nonnegative, 
then Trichotomous equals 0.35. If beginning net operating loss carryforward is positive and pretax income is negative, then 
Trichotomous equals zero. Otherwise, Trichotomous equals 0.17. If beginning net operating loss carryforward equals zero and pretax 
income is nonnegative, then PseudoStatutory equals 0.35. If beginning net operating loss carryforward is zero and pretax income is 
negative, then PseudoStatutory equals 0.15. If beginning net operating loss carryforward is positive and pretax income is positive, then 
PseudoStatutory equals 0.25. Otherwise, PseudoStatutory equals zero. If beginning net operating loss carryforward equals zero and 
pretax income is nonnegative, then Uniform equals 0.35. If beginning net operating loss carryforward is zero and pretax income is 
negative, then Uniform equals 0.11667. If beginning net operating loss carryforward is positive and pretax income is positive, then 
Uniform equals 0.23333. Otherwise, Uniform equals zero.  
 
TaxSimMTR represents simulated marginal tax rates using tax return data, adapted as described in the text. If net income (tax return 
Line 28) less NOL and special deductions (Lines 29 a and b) is less than or equal to zero, then FutureSimple equals zero, but if 
Alternative Minimum Tax exceeds zero FutureSimple equals 2 percent. If net income less NOL and special deductions is greater than 
zero, FutureSimple equals 35 percent, but if Alternative Minimum Tax exceeds zero FutureSimple equals 20 percent. 
FutureSimple2000 and FutureSimple2003 are the year 2000 and 2003 values of FutureSimple. AvgDiscountedFutureSimple1999-2004 
is the average of FutureSimple for each year 1999-2004 discounted to 1998, using a discount rate of 7.5 percent, the approximate 
Moody’s corporate bond rate for that period. Panel B describes various financial statement and tax return (Form 1120) characteristics 
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Table 2, Panel A, Marginal Tax Rate Variables           
   N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Book-based marginal tax rate proxies           
BookSimMTR  1,833 0.305  0.102  0  0.390 
Binary1  1,833 0.265  0.150  0  0.350 
Binary2  1,833 0.225  0.168  0  0.350 
Binary2 (prefinancing)  1,833 0.235  0.164  0  0.350 
Trichotomous  1,833 0.275  0.108  0  0.350 
Trichotomous (prefinancing)  1.833 0.283  0.103  0  0.350 
PseudoStatutory  1,833 0.286  0.103  0  0.350 
PseudoStatutory (prefinancing)  1.833 0.296  0.093  0  0.350 
Uniform  1,833 0.279  0.109  0  0.350 
Uniform (prefinancing)  1,833 0.290  0.100  0  0.350 
          
Tax return marginal tax rate proxies           
TaxSimMTR  1,833 0.295  0.108  0  0.390 
FutureSimple2000  623 0.221  0.161  0  0.350 
FutureSimple2003  488 0.189  0.167  0  0.350 
AvgDiscountedFutureSimple1999-2004  424 0.210  0.129  0  0.350   42
 
Table 2, Panel B – Financial statement and tax return characteristics where levels are in millions of dollars, rounded to avoid identification 
Variable, defined within table  N  Mean  Std Dev  Min  Median  Max 
Assets (Compustat #6)  1833  2229 7626  3.45 400 150000
Book Assets per tax return (Schedule L)  1833  2656 12634  0.00 400 400000
Pretax Income (#170)  1833  219 982  -1400 27 30000
Tax Net Income (tax return Line 28)  1833  146 759  -1100 17 20000
Earnings Before Tax (book) from simulation program  1833  242 1125  -1000 30 30000
Earnings Before Tax (tax return) from simulation program  1833  141 753  -1700 17 20000
Interest expense per simulation program (#15 interest exp.+ 1/3*#47 rents paid)   1833  53 142  0.00 9 2000
Tax return interest deduction (interest paid + 1/3 rents paid)  1833  78 267  0.00 9 5000
BookLossDummy = 1 if #170<=0  1833  0.182 0.386  0.00 0.00 1.00
USBookLossDummy = 1 if U.S. pretax income (#272 or #170 if missing) <=0  1833  0.201 0.401  0.00 0.00 1.00
Taxloss = 1 if Tax Net Income <=0  1833  0.220 0.414  0.00 0.00 1.00
Net Operating Loss Carryover (#52)  1833  33 164  0.00 0.00 3000
NOLDummy = 1 if NOL Carryover>0  1833  0.254 0.436  0.00 0.00 1.00
BookLossNOL = 1 if BookLoss = 1 and BookNOL = 1  1833  0.076 0.265  0.00 0.00 1.00
Beginning Available Tax NOL (from tax return Schedule K )  1833 32 122  0.00 0.00 2100
TaxNOL = 1 if Beginning Available Tax NOL >0  1833  0.449 498  0.00 0.00 1.00
AMT = 1 if firm pays Alternative Minimum Tax on the tax return  1833  0.148 0.356  0.00 0.00 1.00
ForeignActivityDummy = 1 if absolute foreign/worldwide pretax income |#273/#170| > 
0.05   1833 0.353 0.478  0.00 0.00 1.00
FTC = 1  if the taxpayer claims foreign tax credits on tax return  1833  0.385 0.487  0.00 0.00 1.00
USETR = U.S. current tax /U.S. pretax income (#63/#272 or #16/#170 if missing)  1833  0.221 1.490  -53.00 0.32 14.05
USLOW = 1 if USETR < 10%  1833  0.224 0.417  0.00 0.00 1.00  43
Table 3 – Pearson correlation coefficients between the tax return simulated marginal tax rate 
(TaxSimMTR), and naïve actual simple forecast tax return rates, with financial statement measures of 
marginal tax rates. Variables are defined in Table 2. We use our test sample of 1,833 firm-year 
observations from 1998-2000 for the correlations with TaxSimMTR and use observations from 1998 
only for the correlations with the FutureSimple foresight rates. All correlations are significant at < 
0.0001 p-value. 
 
Panel A, All marginal tax rates are post-financing, reflecting actual interest deductions. 
 
Post-financing variables 




 N=1,833  N=623  N=488  N=424 
TaxSimMTR  1  0.564 0.384 0.600 
BookSimMTR  0.671  0.493 0.361 0.499 
Binary1  0.223  0.214 0.146 0.212 
Binary2  0.483  0.436 0.326 0.441 
Trichotomous  0.556  0.460 0.336 0.479 
PseudoStatutory  0.632  0.486 0.361 0.513 
Uniform  0.633  0.495 0.368 0.519 
 
Panel B, All marginal tax rates are prefinancing marginal tax rates and permit no interest deductions. 
For the naïve FutureSimple marginal tax rate, we recompute taxable income on a prefinancing basis 
to determine whether the company is in a loss (0 percent rate or 2 percent with AMT) or profit (35 
percent rate or 20 percent with AMT). 
 
Prefinancing variables 




 N=1,833  N=618  N=475  N=421 
TaxSimMTR  1 0.450 0.373  0.561 
PreIntBookSimMTR  0.760 0.428  0.335  0.520 
Binary1 (uses book  
NOL only) 
0.177 0.182  0.042  0.182 
Binary2  0.406 0.318  0.182  0.353 
Trichotomous  0.484 0.359  0.222  0.415 
PseudoStatutory  0.563 0.376  0.284  0.468 
Uniform  0.561 0.377  0.281  0.464   44
Table 4 – Ordinary least squares regression of the simulated MTRs on financial statement variables for a test sample of 1,833 firm-
year observations in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Table 4 coefficient estimates in Models A and B can be used to predict the simulated tax 
return marginal tax rate (TaxSimMTR) using financial statement variables, and Model C coefficients can be used to “predict” the 
simulated book MTR. Variables are defined in Table 2 or in the table below.  Panel A uses post-financing marginal tax rates that allow 
100 percent of interest deductions.  Panel B uses prefinancing marginal tax rates that allow 0 percent of interest deductions.  
 















Intercept 0.210***  0.336***  0.331*** 
  28.03 131.59  128.92 
BookSimMTR  0.379***    
  17.62    
USBookLossDummy  -0.042*** -0.034**   
  -3.63 -2.70   
LowUSETRDummy   -0.053*** -0.082***  -0.075*** 
  -10.47 -15.91  -14.80 
NOLDummy  -0.022*** -0.028***  -0.012** 
  -5.92 -6.63  -2.92 
BookLossDummy  -0.042*** -0.090***  -0.106*** 
  -3.46 -7.01  -19.07 
ForeignActivityDummy  0.010** 0.024***  0.037*** 
  2.82 6.24  9.68 
Adjusted R
2 58%  51%  45% 
Observations 1,833  1,833  1,833 
***, **, * indicates significant p-value at 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 in two-tailed tests.   45
















Intercept 0.135***  0.342***  0.345*** 
  19.58 160.19 165.08 
BookSimMTR  0.601***    
  31.00    
USBookLossDummy  -0.028** -0.035**   
  -2.71 -2.79   
LowUSETRDummy   -0.020*** -0.053*** -0.055*** 
  -5.65 -12.79 -13.72 
NOLDummy  -0.008** -0.018***  -0.016*** 
  -2.89 -4.98 -4.51 
BookLossDummy  -0.016 -0.070***  -0.103*** 
  -1.47 -5.41  -21.79 
ForeignActivityDummy  0.006** 0.022***  0.026*** 
  2.29 6.48 7.76 
Adjusted R
2 62%  41%  43% 
Observations 1,833  1,833  1,833 
 
***, **, * indicates significant p-value at 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 in two-tailed tests. 
See Table 2, Panel B for variable definitions.   46
Table 5 – Correlations of pre- and post-financing simulated tax MTRs (TaxSimMTR) with 
the estimated tax return MTR (EST_TaxSimMTR) and other financial MTR measures 
using holdout samples of 1,834 post-financing and 1,963 prefinancing observations from 
1998-2000.  The estimated tax return MTR (EST_TaxSimMTR) is calculated using 
coefficients estimated from the test sample in Table 4, Model A, Panels A and B.  The 
first column presents correlations for the post-financing tax rates, and the second column 




  Post-financing Prefinancing 
  TaxSimMTR TaxSimMTR 
  N = 1,834  N = 1,963 
    
EST_TaxSimMTR from Table 4, Model A  0.751   0.723 
    
BookSimMTR  0.653 0.680 
    
Binary1  0.203 0.188 
    
Binary2  0.527 0.431 
    
Trichotomous  0.565 0.494 
    
PseudoStatutory  0.629 0.571 
    
Uniform  0.637 0.571 
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Table 6 –  Estimates of pooled ordinary least squares regressions of debt ratios on 
prefinancing simulated marginal tax rates and controls for leverage, using a test 
sample of 1,771 firm-year observations in 1998, 1999 and 2000, limited to 
observations that are not missing in any specification. PreIntBookSimMTR and 
PreIntTaxSimMTR are measured before interest to avoid the spurious negative 
correlation between income after interest and debt usage (Graham, Lemmon, and 
Schallheim 1998). All other variables use financial statement Compustat data. 
Leverage = total debt (Compustat item #9 + #34), scaled either by total assets 
(#6) or by book assets minus book equity plus market equity (#6 - #60 + 
#199*#25). LagSales = one-year lag of book sales (#12) in thousands. 
LagMarketToBook = one year lag of market value of equity (#199*#25) divided 
by book value of equity (#60). LagDividend = 1 if the one year lag of dividend 
yield (#26*100/#199) is positive, zero otherwise. LagROA = one year lag of 
return on assets (#18/#6). LagCollateral = one year lag of the ratio of inventory 
and property (#3+#8) to assets (#6).  
Dependent 
Variable Æ 
Debt /  
Book Value of Assets 
Debt /  
Market Value of Assets 
       
Intercept  0.069*** 0.112*** -0.018 0.027 
 3.27  5.15  -1.00  1.44 
PreIntBookSimMTR  0.294***  0.433***   
 4.50    7.73   
PreIntTaxSimMTR   0.138*    0.271*** 
   2.02    4.59 
LagSales  0.000 0.000  -0.00106* -0.00105 
 0.19  0.22  -1.98  -1.95 
LagMarketToBook  0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 
 7.90  7.58  -0.48  -0.81 
LagDividend  -0.014 -0.008  -0.046*** -0.040 
 -1.44  -0.89  -5.63  -4.89 
LagROA  -0.084*** -0.042 -0.118*** -0.071 
 -2.92  -1.48  -4.79  -2.92 
LagCollateral  0.173*** 0.180*** 0.208*** 0.214 
 8.21  8.48  11.46  11.70 
       
Observations 1,771  1,771  1,771  1,771 
Adjusted R
2 7.3%  6.4%  11.4%  9.5% 






Z = -2.82## 
 
***, **, * indicates significant p-value at 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
##, # indicates that the Vuong (1989) test of difference in explanatory power is significant at the 0.01 and 
0.05 level.  
 